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A Pursuit Worthiness Account of Analogies in Science 
 
Abstract: Analogies often provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses or models. This is illustrated with a case 
study on the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. I criticise accounts in which analogies provide reasons 
for pursuit through epistemic support, proposing instead that analogies increase the value of learning the 
truth. I consider two accounts of this type: first, that analogies indicate potentials for theoretical unification; 
second, that analogies facilitate the transfer of already well-understood modelling frameworks to new 




For much of the 20th century it was hotly contended whether analogies play any 
normatively interesting role in scientific reasoning. Defending analogies, Norman 
Campbell (1920, ch. 6) and Mary Hesse (1966) responded to Pierre Duhem (1914/1954) 
and his intellectual heirs among the logical empiricists, such as Hans Reichenbach. 
Although the latter critics admitted (grudgingly) that analogies sometimes guide the 
development of scientific theories, they regarded this as a mere psychological curiosity, not 
something that plays any interesting normative role in scientific reasoning (e.g. 
Reichenbach 1944, 66-72). Arguing that analogies serve important purposes that 
philosophers of science ought to account for, Campbell and Hesse opposed these at the 
time widely accepted views. 
 Today, most philosophers interested in the issue agree that analogies play an 
important role in scientific reasoning. A number of different roles for analogies have been 
discussed (Bartha 2013, §1). Some challenge the presumption that generative reasoning is 
beyond the scope of normative theorising. For instance, Nersessian (1988), drawing on 
cognitive psychology and computational modelling, has argued that analogies can function 
as heuristics for developing or articulating scientific theories in ways that are both 
“systematic and subject to evaluation” (1988, 42). Call these generative accounts of 
analogical reasoning. Others take analogies to provide epistemic support for hypotheses 
and consequently propose accounts of how or when analogical arguments can provide this 
kind of support. Call these justificatory accounts. 
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My focus in this paper is on what can be called pursuit worthiness accounts, i.e. 
accounts according to which analogies provide reasons for testing or developing a 
hypothesis further.1 While compatible with the other two, pursuit worthiness accounts are 
necessary for explaining some aspects of scientific reasoning that cannot be captured by 
purely justificatory or generative accounts. To illustrate this point, I outline a case study in 
Section 2, involving the early development of the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus. 
I argue that in this case the liquid drop analogy motivated physicists to pursue the model 
despite it initially facing empirical and theoretical problems. In the remainder of the paper I 
consider different accounts of how analogies justify pursuit. 
I start, in Section 3, by criticising accounts defended by Wesley Salmon (1967) and 
Paul Bartha (2010), according to which analogies provide reasons for pursuing a 
hypothesis in virtue of providing reasons for their truth. I argue that even if analogies 
sometimes provide epistemic support, this is not always a reason in favour of pursuit. 
Instead, I propose that analogies are better seen as justifying pursuit by increasing the 
value of learning whether the hypothesis is true. In Section 4 I consider an account where 
hypotheses based on analogies have a high potential for unification. I argue that while this 
account is plausible for some cases, it does not fit the case of the liquid drop model. 
Finally, in Section 5, I propose an alternative account of this case according to which 
analogies facilitate the transfer of an already well-understood modelling framework to a 
new domain of phenomena. 
 
2. Case Study: The Development of the Liquid Drop Model 
The liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus was developed from the late 1920s onwards, 
during a time where physicists were trying to extend their understanding of the structure of 
atoms to the atomic nucleus itself.2 The model was first proposed in 1928-29 by George 
Gamow, at the time a Russian doctoral student visiting Western Europe, who suggested 
                                                 
1 I borrow the terminology of ‘generative’, ‘justificatory’ and ‘pusuitworthiness’ accounts from McKaughan 
(2008). 
2 The following is based on Stuewer’s (1994) account. 
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that the nucleus “may be treated somewhat as a small drop of water in which the particles 
are held together by surface tension” (cited from Stuewer 1994, 80). In line with common 
assumptions at the time, he modelled the nucleus as consisting of a collection of α-
particles, and assumed that the nucleus was in equilibrium between the kinetic energy of 
the particles and the surface tension. On this basis Gamow then tried to derive an 
expression for the mass defects (i.e. the nuclear binding energy) of the different nuclei. 
Niels Bohr and Ernest Rutherford were enthusiastic about the model, providing 
support for Gamow to develop it from 1929 to 1931. However, while Gamow made some 
progress, he quickly ran into problems. Although his theoretically predicted mass defects 
traced a curve of the same general shape as the experimentally determined ones, it only 
gave reasonably accurate quantitative predictions for the lighter elements. He suspected 
this could be remedied by taking into account the nuclear electrons that were thought to 
exist at the time. However, when he tried to incorporate these into his model he ran into a 
major theoretical problem (the so-called Klein paradox) that he was unable to overcome. 
Consequently, by the summer of 1930 Gamow began to turn his attention elsewhere 
(Stuewer 1994, 78-85). 
Despite these problems, the model quickly became popular among physicists, not 
because they were confident it accurately represented the nucleus, but as a speculative 
attempt to solve certain problems. For instance, in 1930 Rutherford wrote that the model 
“while admittedly imperfect and speculative in character is of much interest as the first 
attempt to give an interpretation of the mass-defect curve of the elements” (cited from 
Steuwer 1994, 86-7). During the 1930s the model was further developed, following two 
broad trajectories. First, following the discovery of neutrons in 1932, Werner Heisenberg 
and Carl von Weizsäcker tried to revise the assumptions of the model to yield an 
empirically more accurate mass defect curve (ibid., 87-97). Second, Bohr and several 
others modified the model in order to account for artificially induced radioactivity (i.e. 
radioactive elements produced by bombarding stable elements with neutrons) as an 
excitation and subsequent ‘evaporation’ of particles from the drop of ‘nuclear fluid’ (97-
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107).3 Finally, in 1938-39 Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, combining insights from both 
research programmes, realised that the liquid drop model could be adapted to explain 
nuclear fission, a newly discovered and at the time highly puzzling phenomenon (107-
116).4 
As is clear from the latter part of this story, the analogy played an important role in 
guiding the revisions and extensions of Gamow’s original model. This use of analogy is 
what generative accounts aim to analyse. I return to this use of the liquid drop analogy in 
Section 5. For now, I want to highlight that already when Gamow proposed the liquid drop 
model in 1928-30, it was received positively and was taken up by a number of physicists, 
despite its initial problems. The analogy also seems to have motivated pursuing the model 
in the first place, before there was any particular reason to think it even approximately true. 
The question that I will focus on in the rest of this paper is why it was more reasonable to 
spend time and resources pursuing this particular model, rather than some alternative 
mathematical model not grounded in analogies. 
 
3. Pursuit Worthiness, Plausibility and Probability 
It might be thought that there is a straightforward answer to this question. Although there 
might not have been grounds for accepting Gamow’s model in 1930, the analogy could 
still have shown it plausible and, the idea goes, the fact that the model was plausible made 
it reasonable to pursue it. But since reasons for regarding a model or hypothesis as 
plausible are merely a weaker form of epistemic support, these are not fundamentally 
different from reasons for its truth.5 
A version of this account was suggested by Wesley Salmon (1967). Salmon was 
responding to N.R. Hanson’s (1958, 1074) claim that there is a fundamental difference 
between reasons for accepting a hypothesis H and “reasons for suggesting H in the first 
                                                 
3 A number of alternative (but sometimes related) analogies also influenced this line of physical theorising 
about atomic nuclei (Stuewer, ibid.). 
4 See also Andersen (1997) on the experimental and theoretical developments which lead to the discovery of 
fission. 
5 See Kordig (1978) for an account along these lines, not specifically concerned with analogies. 
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place” since the latter are “reasons which make H a plausible conjecture” (ibid.). Hanson 
(1077-79) argued that reasons for suggesting hypotheses (what I here call reasons for 
pursuit) can be based on analogies, among other things. Against this, Salmon (1967, 113-
18) argues that plausibility judgements should be understood as estimates of the prior 
probability of a hypothesis. Since in a Bayesian framework it is necessary to make some 
judgement of prior probabilities to evaluate the posterior probability of a hypothesis, this 
furnishes an important role for plausibility judgements without these being fundamentally 
different from reasons for acceptance. According to Salmon, analogical arguments are 
plausibility arguments in this sense (127). 
Whereas Salmon thus equates reasons for pursuit with estimates of prior 
probability, Paul Bartha’s (2010) recent work on analogical reasoning gives a more 
nuanced account of their relation. I here outline some details of Bartha’s account of 
analogical reasoning, since I draw on some of them later on. Following Hesse (1966, 59), 
Bartha endorses a two-dimensional analysis of analogical arguments. While many accounts 
only focus on horizontal relations, i.e. the similarities and differences between the source 
and target system, two-dimensional accounts also emphasise the vertical relations, 
consisting of dependency relations (e.g. causal, modal or explanatory relations) within the 
two domains. Building on this idea, Bartha (2010, ch. 4) defends an inference schema that 
may be summarised as follows: 
 
(B1) There is some structure of dependency relations R(a, b, c, …) between 
features a, b, c, … of the source system, S1. [Prior association]. 
(B2) The target system, S2, has one or more features a’, b’, c’, … analogous 
to a, b, c, … [Potential for generalisation]. 
(B3) S2 does not have any features which would preclude R’ (analogous to 
R) from obtaining. [No critical difference]. 
Therefore: 
(B4) It is prima facie plausible that R’(a’, b’, c’, …) obtains for S2, and a 




The first premise states that there is a “prior association” in S1, in the form of some 
structure of dependency relations between its features. Which kinds of dependency 
relations to look for varies between contexts, but a good example of a structure of 
dependency relations is how the parts of a mechanism interact and constrain each other to 
produce certain effects. Second, we look at whether there is a “potential for 
generalisation”, meaning that the target system has some features analogous to those 
involved in the prior association in S1. Finally, we consider whether there are any “critical 
differences” between the two systems, i.e. whether S2 has any features precluding a 
relation analogous to the prior association from obtaining. Given these premises, according 
to Bartha, it is prima facie plausible to “transfer” the prior association to the target system, 
and thus infer that the relevant further features involved in the prior association obtain in 
S2 as well. 
Bartha highlights that arguments of this type are often used to support hypotheses 
before they have been tested (2010, 6) and that they provide reasons for investigating 
hypotheses further (16). Like Salmon, he thinks this is because analogies support 
plausibility judgements, but Bartha does not equate plausibility judgements with estimates 
of prior probability. That a hypothesis p is ‘prima facie plausible’, he takes instead to mean 
“roughly speaking, … There are sufficient grounds for taking p seriously” (2010, 16). This 
is partly an epistemic notion. A plausible hypothesis, according to Bartha, “has epistemic 
support: we have some reason to believe it, even prior to testing” (15) and it has “an 
appreciable likelihood of being true” (18). But he also takes plausibility judgements to 
have pragmatic connotations: “To say that a hypothesis is plausible typically implies that 
we have good reason to investigate it (subject to the feasibility and value of investigation)” 
(15). In a suggestive footnote (p. 18, note 19) Bartha furthermore mentions that reasons for 
pursuit depend on epistemic support “in a decision-theoretic sense” given “contextual 
information about costs and benefits.” However, he adds that absent this information “the 
two points are at least partially independent” (ibid.). So although epistemic support is 
important to what Bartha means by plausibility, considerations about ‘feasibility’ and 
‘value’ are relevant as well. 
Given this elucidation of what he means by ‘prima facie plausibility’, it is 
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consistent with Bartha’s account that analogical inferences can provide reasons for 
investigating a hypothesis without necessarily providing reasons for its truth. However, in 
practice he tends to focus on epistemic support. For instance, he claims, “Any argument 
that a hypothesis is prima facie plausible … should provide reasons to think the hypothesis 
might be true” (18). Furthermore, he still follows Salmon in identifying a hypothesis’ 
degree of plausibility with its prior probability (e.g. pp. 15-6, 291-302). As I read Bartha, 
analogies primarily provide reasons for pursuing hypotheses by providing epistemic 
support for them. Once this is established, whether we are then justified in pursuing a 
hypothesis all things considered depends on ‘contextual information’, i.e. information in 
addition to that provided by the analogy, about the costs and benefits of pursuing it. 
Although Salmon and Bartha might be right that analogies sometimes give reasons 
for ascribing higher prior probability to a hypothesis, I do not think this gives a satisfactory 
account of how analogies justify pursuit in cases like the liquid drop model. First, it is not 
clear that physicists in 1930 regarded the liquid drop model as significantly more probable 
than so many other possible models. Second, while I agree with Bartha that having reasons 
for pursuing a hypothesis can be elucidated in decision-theoretic terms, he fails to take the 
implications of doing so fully into account. Since being justified in pursuing a hypothesis 
depends on a number of factors apart from its epistemic support, why assume that the 
analogy increased its epistemic support rather than some of the other factors? One cannot 
simply assume that when analogies motivate pursuing a hypothesis, the analogy must 
therefore have provided reasons for its truth. Third, it is not always the case that increasing 
the probability of a hypothesis is a reason in favour of pursuing it, let alone a sufficient 
reason. 
When considering whether to pursue a hypothesis H, we need to take into account 
the different possible outcomes of doing so. We might learn that H is true, but we might 
equally learn that it is false. Furthermore, we should also take into account the possibility 
of getting no useful evidence or – even worse – getting misleading evidence, i.e. evidence 
that leads us to mistakenly accept or reject H. Following Nyrup (2015, 755-6), this can be 
represented in a simple decision-theoretic model. Suppose we only distinguish between 
two possible states of the world, that H is true and that it is false, and that we are interested 
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in a range of epistemic attitudes EA1, EA2, … , EAn we might end up having towards H, (e.g. 
accepting H, rejecting H and staying agnostic).6 Then the expected utility of pursuing H is 
given by: 
 
(1) EU(p(H))    =  Pr(H)   × ∑ [U(EAi(H), H) × Pr(EAi(H) | p(H), H)]  
                + Pr(¬H) × ∑ [U(EAi(H), ¬H) × Pr(EAi(H) | p(H), ¬H)]  
                –     C(p(H)) 
 
The unconditional probabilities in this model represent the probability of H being true (or 
false, respectively) at the given state of inquiry, before further testing. They can both be 
initial probabilities prior to all testing or posterior probabilities given previous testing in 
situations where we are considering whether to pursue H further. It is this quantity that 
Salmon and Bartha take analogical arguments to manipulate. The conditional probabilities 
represent how likely we are, given that H is true (or false), to obtain evidence sufficient to 
adopt the attitude EAi towards H. For instance, if EA1 is acceptance then Pr(EA1(H) | p(H), 
H) represents how likely we are to get reliable evidence in favour of H, while Pr(EA1(H) | 
p(H), ¬H) is how likely we are to get misleading evidence in favour of H. U(EA1(H), H) 
represents the value of, e.g., correctly accepting H, while U(EA1(H), ¬H) measures how 
problematic it would be to mistakenly accept H, and mutatis mutandis for other epistemic 
attitudes. Finally, C(p(H)) is the cost (time, resources, etc.) of pursuing H.7 
This analysis highlights that there are a number of different factors relevant to 
whether it is worth pursuing a hypothesis. In order for an argument to provide additional 
reasons for pursuing H, it must be the case that it increases our estimate of EU(p(H)). But 
there is no reason to suppose that it must increase the probability of H being true rather 
than, e.g., showing that it would be more interesting to know whether H is true, showing 
that H is less costly to pursue or showing that pursuing H is more likely to produce reliable 
                                                 
6 It is possible to include further states of the world, e.g. various degrees to which H is partially true, or a 
broader range of epistemic attitudes without changing the conclusions I draw from this model. 
7 I assume for simplicity that these costs are commensurable with the utility of knowing whether H is true 
and that the costs of pursuing H are independent of its truth. 
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evidence. In fact, unlike these other factors, it is not generally the case that increasing 
Pr(H) raises EU(p(H)). For instance, if it would be easy to falsify H but difficult to get 
reliable evidence to confirm it, or if knowing that H is false would be more interesting than 
knowing that it is true, reducing Pr(H) could raise EU(p(H)) (cf. Nyrup 2015, 759). 
 
4. Analogies as Guides to Unification 
I have so far criticised the assumption that analogies provide reasons for pursuit by 
providing epistemic support. I propose that analogies instead justify pursuing H by 
increasing the value of knowing whether H is true. I develop this proposal in the remainder 
of this paper. More specifically, I consider two accounts of this type. I start with the idea 
that analogies indicate hypotheses that would provide increased theoretical unification, if 
shown true. While plausible for some cases, I will propose an alternative account in the 
next section which better accounts for the liquid drop case. 
 Campbell’s defence of analogies in physics was arguably based on the 
unificationist idea. While he thought that theories based on mechanical analogies are more 
likely to be false than ones which merely posit generalised laws extrapolated from 
observed regularities (152), he argues that analogically based theories are valuable “simply 
because the ideas which they bring to mind are intrinsically valuable” (1920, 132). The 
reason is that they offer the chance of laws capable of unifying quantities from previously 
distinct domains, e.g., heat and momentum, in the case of the billiard ball model of gases. 
Insofar as we consider it an intrinsically valuable project to achieve this kind of 
unification, we “must balance that value against the chance of error” (152). Although 
Campbell does not elaborate much further on these remarks, it is clear that the value he 
ascribes to analogies is not that they provide increased epistemic support for theories. 
 The idea that the value of obtaining unifying theories has to be balanced against the 
risk of error fits the decision-theoretic model outlined above. If we agree with Campbell 
that it is intrinsically valuable to discover that a unifying theory is true, this would increase 
the first term of equation (1). If this value is sufficiently high, it could outweigh a 
decreased prior probability, which would otherwise shift the weight towards the second 
term of the equation (but notice, again, that reducing prior probability does not necessarily 
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decrease overall the expected utility of pursuit). 
This account also fits one line of justification Bartha (2010, ch. 7) offers for his 
account, viz. that it tends to promote the traditional theoretical virtues, in particular 
unification.8 If we construe unification as the ability to explain a wide range of phenomena 
using the same basic explanatory pattern (Kitcher 1989), we can see how this fits Bartha’s 
inference schema. Premise (B1) identifies the existence of the explanatory pattern R (the 
prior association) in S1, while (B2) points out that there are a number of features in S2 that 
could potentially be explained by the same pattern. Since (B3) there is no known reason to 
rule out this possibility, there is a potential for unifying the relevant features of S1 and S2 
in single explanatory schema. So if we were to discover that R holds for S2, we would 
have increased the unification of our knowledge of the world. 
In my view, this account of analogies provides a plausible account of how 
analogical reasoning justifies pursuit in some cases but not all. In cases such as the billiard 
ball analogy for gases or the ‘waves in a mechanical medium’ analogy for light (discussed 
e.g. by Hesse 1966, Nersessian 1988), the analogies do seem to promise to unify 
thermodynamical and optical phenomena, respectively, with the theoretical framework of 
classical mechanics. From the perspective of nineteenth-century physicists, these analogies 
pointed to potential increases in theoretical unification. However, this story does not work 
for cases like the liquid drop model. Although Bohr, Rutherford and other physicists 
regarded Gamow’s analogy as suggesting a very promising line of research, this does not 
seem to be because it promised to unify the physics of water drops and atomic nuclei. The 
liquid drop model employs modelling techniques analogous to those applied to water 
drops, but it was clear that the explanations for the two kinds of phenomena would be very 
different. Even if one might hope that an increased understanding of the atomic nucleus 
could eventually lead to a unified account of the two types of systems, the liquid drop 
                                                 
8 Bartha argues that analogies are also conducive to coherence, simplicity and fruitfulness, but regards 
unification as the most central. Bartha (2010, 256) here recognises that as long as we consider these virtues 
valuable to achieve, this is sufficient to show a hypothesis ‘plausible’ in his sense of ‘worthy of 
investigation’. However, he also suggests that his argument can be combined with the argument that the 
theoretical virtues are “indicators of empirical adequacy (or truth)” (ibid.). 
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model does not in itself promise to achieve this kind of unification in the way that the 
billiard ball model and mechanical ether models did. 
 
5. Transferring Modelling Frameworks Through Analogies 
In order to account for how analogies justify pursuit in cases like the liquid drop model, we 
need to switch to a more dynamic account of the relation between analogies and scientific 
models. I have so far focused on whether analogies can justify pursuing a specific 
hypothesis. However, in the liquid drop case, Gamow and those who subsequently worked 
on the liquid drop model did not exactly pursue any specific hypothesis about the structure 
of the atomic nucleus. Rather, they tried to model the atomic nucleus as if it were a water 
drop in order to construct a potential explanation of some otherwise puzzling phenomenon 
– i.e. the mass defect curve for Gamow, Heisenberg and Weizsäcker, artificial radioactivity 
for Bohr and his colleagues, and nuclear fission for Meitner and Frisch. They were of 
course still interested in achieving a correct (or at least empirically accurate) description of 
the nucleus, but their first priority was to formulate a potential explanation of the target 
phenomenon. Rather than pursuing a specific hypothesis, the water drop analogy motivated 
the pursuit of the research project of adapting a modelling framework to the atomic 
nucleus for certain explanatory purposes. Or, if we want to say that they pursued a 
hypothesis, it was not one of the form “the atomic nucleus has features a, b, c, … 
analogous to a water drop” but rather something like “modelling the atomic nucleus 
analogously to a water drop can provide a (correct) explanation of phenomena x, y, z, ….” 
That analogies guide the development hypotheses is also emphasised by proponents 
of generative accounts, such as Nersessian (1988). But it is important to notice that 
adopting a dynamic view of the relation between models and analogies does not in itself 
answer the question of why it was reasonable to pursue an analogical modelling 
framework, rather than so many others. This is how pursuit worthiness accounts differ 
from generative accounts. The latter primarily describe the cognitive role analogies play in 
shaping and guiding the development of novel scientific theories. Pursuit worthiness 
accounts, by contrast, justify why one should choose to develop a theory using analogies in 
the first place.  
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That analogies should be a help in developing theories is not obvious. Campbell 
(1920, 130), for instance, disagreed: “Analogy, so far from being a help to the 
establishment of theories, is the greatest hindrance. It is never difficult to find a theory 
which will explain the laws logically; what is difficult is to find one which will explain 
them logically and at the same time display the requisite analogy. … To regard analogy as 
an aid to the invention of theories is as absurd as to regard melody as an aid to the 
composition of sonatas.” Now, pace Campbell, it might be that imposing constraints 
actually makes it easier to come up with genuinely novel ideas. However, the core point 
here is that the relevant question is not how to most effectively come up with novel ideas, 
but rather how to come up with ideas that are worth pursuing. Sometimes, e.g. if we lack 
any possible explanations, coming up with genuinely novel ideas might be intrinsically 
desirable. But in other cases, e.g. if we are overwhelmed by too many hypotheses, we may 
instead prefer to restrict ourselves to generating hypotheses of high quality. 
So why are modelling frameworks based on analogies more pursuit worthy in cases 
like the liquid drop model? I want to end by proposing that these frameworks are more 
pursuit worthy because they facilitate the transfer of a modelling framework to construct 
explanations in a new domain.9 One simple reason for trying to adapt an already existing 
modelling framework to a new case is that this is typically easier and less time consuming 
than developing a new one from scratch. Thus, transferring a modelling framework by 
analogy can often reduce the costs of pursuit. 
However, constructing new explanations using analogically transferred modelling 
frameworks arguably also increases the potential understanding one can achieve through 
those explanations. This is because achieving scientific understanding of some 
phenomenon depends upon having a well-understood modelling framework. 
Understanding why a phenomenon occurs requires that one understands the model one 
                                                 
9 This account is inspired by Hesse’s and Bartha’s idea that analogical inferences “transfer” explanations 
from one domain to another. However, as emphasised above, I focus on adapting a framework to produce 
new explanations rather than one-off inferences. In this respect, it is closer to Hesse’s (1966: 157-177) 
suggestion that analogies provide a form of explanation by “metaphorically redescribing” the target domain 
in terms of the source analogy. 
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understands the phenomenon with (Strevens 2013: 513; cf. de Regt 2009). Thus, if an 
already well-understood modelling framework can be adapted to produce a correct 
explanation, little work is needed to realise its explanatory potential. One might eventually 
achieve a similar understanding of a new, purpose-built modelling framework. But, first, it 
would typically require a lot more effort to achieve this level of understanding. And, 
second, the analogically based framework offers an already proven explanatory power, as 
opposed to a merely potentially achievable one. In this way, even though in physicists in 
1930 did not know that Gamow’s model could be adapted to explain the respective 
phenomena they sought to explain, they still had good reasons to pursue the modelling 
approach indicated by the liquid drop analogy. 
 
References 
Andersen, Hanne. 1997. “Categorization, Anomalies and the Discovery of Nuclear 
Fission”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27:463-492. 
Bartha, Paul. 2010. By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation of Analogical 
Arguments, New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2013. “Analogy and Analogical Reasoning”. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), ed. Edward Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/reasoning-analogy/. 
Campbell, Norman. 1920. Physics: The Elements, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
de Regt, Henk. 2009. “The Epistemic Value of Understanding”, Philosophy of Science 
76:585-97. 
Duhem, Pierre. 1914/1954. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Repr. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hanson, Norwood Russell. 1958. “The Logic of Discovery”, Journal of Philosophy 
55:1073-1089. 
Hesse, Mary. 1966. Models and Analogies in Science, Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press. 
Kitcher, Philip. 1989. “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World.” In 
14 
 
Scientific Explanation, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 13, eds. 
Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon, 410–505, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Kordig, Carl. 1978. “Discovery and Justification”, Philosophy of Science 45:110-117. 
McKaughan, Daniel. 2008. “From Ugly Duckling to Swan: C. S. Peirce, Abduction, and 
the Pursuit of Scientific Theories”, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 
44:446-468. 
Nersessian, Nancy. 1988. “Reasoning from Imagery and Analogy in Scientific Concept 
Formation”. In PSA 1988, Volume One: Contributed Papers, eds. Arthur Fine and 
Jarrett Leplin, 41-47, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Assocation. 
Nyrup, Rune. 2015. “How Explanatory Reasoning Justifies Pursuit: A Peircean View of 
IBE”, Philosophy of Science 82:749-760. 
Reichenbach, Hans. 1944. Philosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Salmon, Wesley. 1967. The Foundations of Scientific Inference, Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Strevens, Michael. 2013. “No understanding without explanation”, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 44:510-515. 
Stuewer, Roger. 1994. “The Origin of the Liquid-Drop Model and the Interpretation of 
Nuclear Fission”, Perspectives on Science 2:76-129. 
